Zinn’s thesis 7:
In 1865 Congress was pushed to act.
Opposing view:
Pushed to act by whom? In fact, with the southern states out of the way (for, having seceded, representatives of those states were not yet readmitted to Congress) the Radical Republicans had their chance to push forward progressive pieces of legislation which included the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and 1875 as well as three new amendments to the Constitution: the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments passed in 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively. Lincoln and other Republicans worked behind the scenes to secure enough Democratic votes for the 13th Amendment to pass, but where is the popular pressure coming from for them to act?
Indeed, it did not appear at all certain that there was enough support in Congress for the Thirteenth Amendment to pass; Lincoln’s efforts are credited with making the crucial difference. Certainly, ex-slaves and anti-slavery whites wished for such legislation but by and large they were not wealthy, powerful, or well-organized constituencies. They wrote letters and petitions by the score, true, but the nation was dealing with a kind of physical and spiritual exhaustion from the Civil War itself.
There were many who were not in favor of this Amendment; there were those who were even wondering (and wishing) if Lincoln could undo the Emancipation Proclamation itself! If there had been widespread popular protests aimed at overcoming bigotry and institutionalized racism historians surely would have discovered them by now, but these elected leaders prepared to act with no large-scale demonstrations demanding them to do so taking place outside their windows.
The Radical Republicans in Congress had already established their abolitionist sentiments; they were eager to advance the cause of the newly freed slaves insofar as they dared. A smaller group within them, spearheaded by Charles Sumner in the Senate and Thaddeus Stevens in the House, went further; they believed Blacks must have the right to vote if their new-found freedom was to be protected (not even all their Radical Republican brethren believed as much).
Additional pressure was not needed for them to act legislatively nor would anyone have met with much success in trying to persuade them otherwise. They were morally committed and efforts to change their personal views, had anyone tried to dissuade them from their political convictions, would have been pointless.
Those who elected them, those who gloried in the Union victory and were gladdened by the prospect of a new era for American democracy, remained their loyal supporters—no demonstrations were needed for these men to realize the gravity of the moment and how much responsibility lay on their shoulders. They were ready to move forward with the most practical and progressive Reconstruction policies they could devise, come what may. Considering how racist much of the country remained, considering the opposition the Radical Republicans received from various quarters, it is hard to conclude that Congress in 1865-1870 was responding solely to popular pressure!
It is manifestly unfair to these men, to these Radical Republicans, to barely acknowledge that they acted from moral impulse and their own principled initiative. They took the lead in shaping progressive policies for their own generation, including passing the right to vote for Black men–even at a time when so many in the country did not favor it. America has had its share of men and women who were true leaders in the best sense of the word: not waiting for others to act but themselves showing the way.
Not all legislative initiative comes about through popular protest—this is an egregious fallacy in Zinn’s reasoning, a mistake that begets other erroneous corollaries as a result.
